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Dark	markets:	does	private	information	make	price
formation	less	efficient?
Speaking	in	January	2014,	Michel	Barnier	(then	the	European	Commissioner	for	Internal	Market	and	Services
and	now	the	Commission’s	chief	negotiator	with	the	UK	over	Brexit)	justified	new	rules	on	securities	exchange,
which	will	come	into	full	force	in	January	2018,	in	the	following	way:
‘The	MiFID	II	reform	means	that	organised	trading	of	financial	instruments	must	shift	to	multilateral	and	well-
regulated	trading	platforms.	Strict	transparency	rules	will	ensure	that	dark	trading	of	shares	and	other	equity
instruments	which	undermine	efficient	and	fair	price	formation	will	no	longer	be	allowed.’
Barnier’s	statement	reflects	the	belief	that	centralised,	transparent	markets	provide	better	price	discovery	than
‘over-the-counter’	markets,	where	negotiation	and	trade	can	be	kept	private	(‘dark’)	to	the	parties	involved	for	a
long	time.	But	is	this	belief	correct?	Would	information	percolate	less	effectively	in	a	decentralised	market	than	in
a	centralised	one?
Testing	the	theory
Financial	economists	such	as	Darrell	Duffie	(Stanford	University),	Semyon	Malamud	(EPFL)	and	Gustavo	Manso
(UC	Berkeley)	have	developed	a	theory	that	predicts	no	difference.	But	this,	too,	is	theory,	and	just	because	one
can	find	an	argument	to	support	a	view	does	not	make	it	true.	One	can	only	tell	by	testing	the	theory.
Our	recent	article	published	provides	clarification.	In	a	series	of	controlled	experiments,	we	set	out	to	test	the
theory	that	opaque	markets	make	price	formation	less	efficient.	We	discovered	that,	contrary	to	Barnier’s	belief,
decentralised	trading	does	not	seem	to	stand	in	the	way	of	information	aggregation.
We	distributed	private	signals	about	the	true	value	of	the	traded	asset	and	observed	that	these	signals	became
rapidly	reflected	in	traded	prices.	More	precisely,	while	trades	did	not	necessarily	take	place	at	the	correct	price,
those	transaction	prices	stayed	within	narrow	bounds	of	the	correct	price,	implying	that	everyone	was	trading
fairly.
While	there	necessarily	was	more	price	volatility	than	in	a	centralized	market,	the	average	transaction	price
correctly	reflected	value.	In	finance	parlance,	the	market	quickly	became	“informationally	efficient.”	Market
participants	may	not	have	been	aware	of	how	effective	information	was	being	aggregated,	which	explains	why
prices	remained	volatile	throughout	trading.
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Effects	on	efficiency
The	study	also	points	to	the	link	(or	the	lack	thereof)	between	the	above-mentioned	informational	efficiency	and
the	allocative	efficiency	of	markets.	Finance	scholars	focus	on	the	former	because	prices	are	used	as	signals	to
aid	managers	in	capital	budgeting.	Economists,	on	the	other	hand,	are	primarily	interested	in	allocative	efficiency,
which	concerns	the	extent	to	which	the	possible	gains	from	trade	are	exhausted.	The	realized	gains	from	trade	in
the	experimental	dark	markets	range	from	0	to	49	per	cent.	Significantly,	there	appears	to	be	no	particular
relationship	between	informational	and	allocative	efficiency.
In	contrast,	the	same	experiment	conducted	over	centralized	markets	generates	higher	informational	efficiency,
but	the	gains	from	trade	range	from	negative	values	(meaning	that	inefficient	trades	were	conducted)	to	a	high	of
only	30	per	cent.
How	can	one	explain	the	differences	in	the	two	market	institutions	in	the	gains	from	trades	dimension?	Our
conjecture	is	that	the	prices	in	centralized	markets	serve	as	“public	signals”	about	values,	and	thus	induce	the
well-known	‘Hirshleifer	effect’	(Hirshleifer,	1971)	whereby	in	complete	markets	with	initially	uninformed	traders,
the	receipt	of	a	public	signal	prior	to	trading	impairs	risk-sharing	and	therefore	reduces	welfare	(in	comparison	to
the	‘no	public	signal’	case).
The	findings	do	not	mean	that	decentralized	markets	work	in	all	settings.	In	the	experiment,	the	design	followed
closely	that	of	the	theory	of	Duffie	and	co-authors.	Crucially,	traders	knew	whether	the	counterparty	was
interested	in	buying	or	in	selling.	That	is,	the	intentions	of	the	parties	(to	buy	or	to	sell)	were	known.	The	design
resembles	that	of	an	over-the-counter	market	such	as	the	FX	(foreign	exchange)	markets,	where	participants
generally	know	net	desired	positions	of	the	main	market	makers,	but	not	resale	values.
Implications	for	the	future
Our	findings	demonstrate	a	more	general	point,	which	is	the	need	for	rigorous	testing	of	economists’	claims	in	a
controlled	setting	before	policies	are	enacted.	While	this	is	established	practice	in	fields	such	as	aviation	and
pharmacology,	laboratory	testing	of	the	kind	that	we	present	in	our	article	is	yet	to	be	introduced	in	finance.
Without	controlled	experimentation,	Barnier’s	points	of	view,	and	those	of	dissenting	economists,	are	mere
imaginary	conjecture.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	Experiments	on	Percolation	of	Information	in	Dark	Markets,
The	Economic	Journal,	October	2017.	
The	study	was	funded	by	the	U.S.	National	Science	Foundation.	Experiments	were	run	at	Caltech	and	at
the	University	of	Utah.	They	developed	and	used	the	Flex-E-Markets	online	trading	platform,	which	is	freely
available	to	all	researchers.	
This	blog	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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